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Abstract
We consider a dynamic collective choice problem where a large number of players are cooperatively
choosing between multiple destinations while being influenced by the behavior of the group. For
example, in a robotic swarm exploring a new environment, a robot might have to choose between
multiple sites to visit, but at the same time it should remain close to the group to achieve some
coordinated tasks. We show that to find a social optimum for our problem, one needs to solve a set
of Linear Quadratic Regulator problems, whose number increases exponentially with the size of the
population. Alternatively, we develop via the Mean Field Games methodology a set of decentralized
strategies that are independent of the size of the population. When the number of agents is sufficiently
large, these strategies qualify as approximately socially optimal. To compute the approximate social
optimum, each player needs to know its own state and the statistical distributions of the players’ initial
states and problem parameters. Finally, we give a numerical example where the cooperative and non-
cooperative cases have opposite behaviors. Whereas in the former the size of the majority increases
with the social effect, in the latter, the existence of a majority is disadvantaged.
Index Terms
Mean Field Games, Collective Choice, Multi-Agent Systems, Social Optimum.
I. INTRODUCTION
Discrete choice models were developed in economics to understand human choice behavior. A
concern of these models is predicting the decision of an individual in face of a set of alternatives,
for example, anticipating a traveler’s choice between different modes of transportation [1]. These
choices depend on some personal characteristics, such as the traveler’s financial situation, on
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2some attributes of the alternatives, such as their prices, and on some unobservable attributes,
e.g., the traveler’s taste. The first static discrete choice model was proposed by McFadden in
[2].
In some situations, the individuals’ choices are socially influenced, that is, an individual’s
choice is affected by the others’ choices, for example entry or withdrawal from the labor market
in cooperative families [3]. The main goal of this paper is to model within the framework of
dynamic cooperative game theory situations where a large number of players/agents are making
socially influenced choices among a finite set of alternatives. The players involved in this game
are weakly coupled, that is, the individual choices are considerably influenced by a functional
of the others’ choice distribution (in this paper the mean), but for a sufficiently large population,
an isolated individual’s choice has a negligible influence on the others’ choices. Moreover, the
players’ states contributing to the social effect are assumed indistinguishable. In navigation
applications for example, a planner might want to deploy a swarm of robots cooperating to
explore an unknown terrain. A robot faces a situation where it should choose between multiple
sites to visit. At the same time, it should remain closed to the group to achieve some coordinated
tasks [4]–[6].
In non-cooperative games, perfectly rational players act selfishly by minimizing their individual
costs irrespective of making the other players better off or worse off. This “utilitarianist” aspect
of non-cooperative games neglects the social context where the social norms, social values, the
presence of a social planner or the social structures impose a kind of cooperation between the
players. An example of the influence of the social context on the behavior of players was given
in [7], where the author shows how at the Chicago Options Exchange the relations among the
traders, supposed to be noncooperative, affect their trades. In the robotic swarm example, the
cooperative behavior of the robots results from the intention of the planner to optimize a total
cost. Whereas in the non-cooperative case the agents search for a Nash equilibrium, the players
seek in the cooperative case a totally different type of solution, namely a social optimum.
The Mean Field Games (MFG) methodology, which we follow in this paper, is concerned with
dynamic games involving a large number of weakly coupled agents. It was originally developed
in a series of papers to study dynamic non-cooperative games [8]–[14]. The cooperative Linear
Quadratic Gaussian (LQG) MFG formulation was developed later in [15], where the authors
investigate the structure of the LQG costs to develop for a continuum of agents a set of
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3decentralized person-by-person optimal strategies (a weaker solution concept than the social
optimum that coincides under some conditions with the social optimum [16], [17]). Moreover,
they show that these strategies, when applied by a finite population, converge to an exact social
optimum as the number of players increases to infinity.
The main contribution of this paper is as follows. We consider a cooperative collective choice
model where the number of candidate optimal control laws increases exponentially with the size
of the population. Then, we develop a set of decentralized strategies of dimensions independent
of the size of the population and that converge to the social optimum as the size of the
population increases to infinity. Although the methodology used to solve the game follows [15],
the non-smoothness and non-convexity of our final costs, which involve a minimum function,
require different proofs for the convergence of the mean field based decentralized strategies to
the social optimum, see Lemmas 5, 8, Theorem 6 and Remark 3. In particular, our problem
formulation results in decentralized strategies that are discontinuous with respect to the agents’
initial conditions, capturing the issue of choosing between a finite set of alternatives, which
cannot be modeled using the standard LQG MFG setup considered in [15].
In [18], we studied the non-cooperative version of our model and developed via the MFG
methodology approximate Nash strategy profiles that converge to exact Nash equilibria as the
number of players increases to infinity. Since the person-by-person solutions are Nash-like
solutions, we rely in this note on some results established in [18] to establish the existence
of the person-by-person solutions and compute them. A static discrete choice model with social
interactions was also studied by Brock and Durlauf in [19], where the authors develop a non-
cooperative and a cooperative game involving a large number of players. Each player makes
a choice between two alternatives while being affected by the average of its peers’ decisions.
Inspired by the statistical mechanics approach, Brock and Durlauf propose a methodology to
solve the game that is similar to the MFG approach.
The cooperative dynamic discrete choice model is formulated in Section II. We show in
Section III that to find an exact social optimum, one can naively solve lN Linear Quadratic
Regulator (LQR) problems, each of dimensions Nn, where l is the number of choices, N the
number of players, and n the dimension of the individual state spaces. Alternatively, we develop
in Section IV via the MFG approach and within the so-called person to person optimization
setting a set of decentralized strategies that are asymptotically socially optimal. The dimensions
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4of the decentralized strategies are independent of the size of the population. In Section V we
give some simulation results, while Section VI presents our conclusions.
II. MATHEMATICAL MODEL
We consider a cooperative game model involving N players with linear dynamics
x˙i = Aixi +Biui i = 1, . . . , N, (1)
where Ai ∈ Rn×n, Bi ∈ Rn×m, xi ∈ Rn is the state of agent i, ui ∈ U = L2([0, T ],Rm) its
control input and x0i its initial state. The players cooperate to minimize a common social cost
Jsoc
(
u1, . . . , uN , x
(N)
)
=
N∑
i=1
Ji
(
ui, x
(N)
)
, (2)
where
Ji
(
ui, x
(N)
)
=
∫ T
0
{q
2
∥∥xi − Zx(N)∥∥2 + ri
2
‖ui‖2
}
dt + min
j=1,...,l
{
Mij
2
‖xi(T )− pj‖2
}
(3)
are the individual costs, q, ri,Mij > 0, Z ∈ Rn×n, and pj ∈ Rn, j = 1, . . . , l, are the destination
points. The individual cost functions penalize along the path the effort and the deviation from
the mean. Moreover, each agent must be close at time T to one of the destination points.
Otherwise, it is strongly penalized by the final cost. The agents are cost coupled via the average
x(N) = 1
N
∑N
i=1 xi. The coefficient ri depends on the agent i. In the robotic swarm example,
this reflects, for instance, the intention of the social planner to limit the mobility of some
robots. We assume that the coefficient Mij depends on the agent i and the destination point
pj to impose initial preferences towards the alternatives, as discussed later in Remark 1. When
considering the limiting population (N →∞), it is convenient to represent the limiting sequences
of (θi)i=1,...,N := {(Ai, Bi, ri,Mi1, . . . ,Mil)}i=1,...,N and {x0i }i=1,...,N by two independent random
variables θ and x0 on some probability space (Ω,F ,P). We assume that θ is in a compact set Θ.
Let us denote the empirical measures of the sequences θi and x0i , PNθ (A) = 1N
∑N
i=1 1{θi∈A} and
PN0 (A) = 1N
∑N
i=1 1{x0i∈A} for all (Borel) measurable sets A. We assume that PNθ and PN0 have
weak limits Pθ and P0. For further discussions about this assumption, one can refer to [15].
A social optimum is defined as the optimal control law (u∗1, . . . , u
∗
N) of (2). We start in the
following section by solving for such a social optimum in a centralized manner.
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5III. CENTRALIZED SOCIAL OPTIMUM
In this section, we assume that each player can observe the states and the parameters of the
other players. We define x = (x1, . . . , xN)T the state of the population and u = (u1, . . . , uN)T
its strategy profile. The population’s dynamics is then
x˙ = A˜x+ B˜u, (4)
where A˜ = diag(A1, . . . , AN) and B˜ = diag(B1, . . . , BN). The individual costs can be written
Ji
(
ui, x
(N)
)
= min
pj∈∆
J
pj
i
(
ui, x
(N)
)
, (5)
where ∆ = {p1, . . . , pl} and
J
pj
i
(
ui, x
(N)
)
=
∫ T
0
{q
2
∥∥xi − Zx(N)∥∥2 + ri
2
‖ui‖2
}
dt +
Mij
2
‖xi(T )− pj‖2.
Using the equality a+ min(b, c) = min(a+ b, a+ c), one can prove by induction that the social
cost (2) can be written
Jsoc
(
u, x(N)
)
= min
d=(d1,...,dN )∈∆N
N∑
i=1
Jdii
(
ui, x
(N)
)
.
Noting that
inf
u∈UN
Jsoc
(
u, x(N)
)
= min
d∈∆N
inf
u∈UN
N∑
i=1
Jdii
(
ui, x
(N)
)
,
one can optimize the lN costs Jd(u) =
∑N
i=1 J
di
i (ui, x
(N)) and choose the less costly combination
of destination points d∗ ∈ ∆N which corresponds to the minimum of the optima of Jd. The
costs Jd, for d ∈ ∆N , can be written
Jd(u) =
∫ T
0
{
1
2
xT Q˜x+
1
2
uT R˜u
}
dt +
1
2
(x(T )− d)TM˜d(x(T )− d), (6)
where Q˜ = In⊗IN+ 1N (11T )⊗L, R˜ = diag(r1Im, . . . , rNIm), M˜d = diag(M1d1In, . . . ,MNdN In),
and
L = ZTZ − Z − ZT , (7)
with ⊗ denoting the Kronecker product, 1 = [1, . . . , 1]T , diag(.) denoting a block diagonal
matrix.
The LQR problem defined by (6) and (4) has a unique optimal control law [20]
ud∗(t) = −R˜−1B˜T
(
Γ˜d(t)x+ β˜d(t)
)
(8)
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6with the corresponding optimal cost
Jd∗ (x(0)) =
1
2
x(0)T Γ˜d(0)x(0) + β˜d(0)Tx(0) + δ˜d(0), (9)
where Γ˜d, β˜d and δ˜d are respectively matrix-, vector-, and real-valued functions satisfying the
following backward propagating differential equations:
˙˜Γd − Γ˜dB˜R˜−1B˜T Γ˜d + Γ˜dA˜+ A˜T Γ˜d + Q˜ = 0 (10a)
˙˜βd =
(
Γ˜dB˜R˜−1B˜T − A˜T
)
β˜d (10b)
˙˜δd =
1
2
(β˜d)T B˜R˜−1B˜T β˜d (10c)
with the final conditions Γ˜d(T ) = M˜d, β˜d(T ) = −M˜dd and δ˜d(T ) = 1
2
dTM˜dd.
We summarize the above analysis in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The social planner problem (2) has an optimal control law uv∗ defined in (8) and
corresponding to
Jv∗ = min
d∈∆N
Jd∗ .
As discussed in Section II, to capture the discrete choice phenomenon, the final cost forces
the agents to be at time T in the vicinity of one of the destination points. Indeed, the following
theorem establishes that for sufficiently large Mij , each player reaches an arbitrarily small
neighborhood of a destination point. Moreover, it asserts that there is only one set of destination
points p∗ ∈ RNn that the agents can reach exactly under an optimal control law, namely, the
final state x0(T ) under the control law u0 optimizing
J0(u) =
∫ T
0
{
1
2
xT Q˜x+
1
2
uT R˜u
}
dt, (11)
i.e., (6) without the final cost.
Theorem 2: Suppose that (Ai, Bi), i = 1, . . . , N , are controllable and the agents are minimiz-
ing (2). Then,
i. for any  > 0, there exists M0 > 0 such that for all Mij > M0, each agent is at time T
inside a ball of radius  and centered at one of the destination points.
ii. the agents 1, . . . , N reach at time T the destination points d = (d1, . . . , dN) ∈ ∆N if and
only if d = p∗.
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7Proof: Let  > 0 and d ∈ ∆N . The pairs (Ai, Bi), for i = 1, . . . , N , are controllable.
Therefore, there exist N continuous control laws u˜i, i = 1, . . . , N , such that the corresponding
final states satisfy x˜i(T ) = di, i = 1, . . . , N . Let u˜ = (u˜i, u˜−i). We have
Jd(u˜) =
∫ T
0
{
1
2
x˜T Q˜x˜+
1
2
u˜T R˜u˜
}
dt.
By optimality, we have
N∑
i=1
Midi
2
∥∥xi(ud∗)(T )− di∥∥2 ≤ Jd∗ ≤ Jd(u˜).
The cost Jd(u˜) is independent of Mij . Therefore, there exists M0d > 0 such that for all Midi >
M0d , ‖xi(ud∗)(T )− di‖2 < , for i = 1, . . . , N . By choosing M0 = max
d∈∆N
M0d , we get i).
Next, suppose that d 6= p∗ for all d ∈ ∆N . The optimal social cost is Jd∗ , for some d and
some Midi , i = 1, . . . , N . We suppose that the players reach under their optimal strategies the
destination points d1, . . . , dN . Let M ′idi > Midi for i = 1, . . . , N . We have, for all u ∈ UN ,
J ′(u) ≥ Jd(u) where
J ′(u) =
∫ T
0
{
1
2
xT Q˜x+
1
2
uT R˜u
}
dt +
N∑
i=1
M ′idi
2
‖xi(T )− di‖2.
Under ud∗, the players 1, . . . , N reach d1, . . . , dN . Therefore,
J ′
(
ud∗
)
= Jd
(
ud∗
)
= min
u
Jd(u) = Jd∗ .
Therefore, min
u
J ′(u) = min
u
Jd(u). This equality holds for all M ′idi > Midi , i = 1, . . . , N . The
solutions of (10a)-(10c) are analytic functions of M˜d (for a proof of the analyticity one can
refer to [21]). Therefore, the optimal cost minu J ′(u) defined in (9) is an analytic function of
M ′idi . But minu J
′(u) is constant for all M ′idi > Midi . Therefore, by analyticity, it is constant
for all M ′idi ≥ 0, and more precisely for M ′idi = 0. This implies that ud∗ is the optimal control
law of J0(u) defined in (11). The definition of p∗ implies that x
(
ud∗
)
(T ) = p∗ 6= d. This is a
contradiction, so in fact some of the agents cannot reach their destination point.
Now suppose that there exists v ∈ ∆N such that v = p∗. We have Jv(u) ≥ J0(u) for all u.
Following the definition of p∗, we have
min
u
J0(u) = J0(u0) = J
v(u0).
Therefore, the optimal control of Jv is uv∗ = u0. Hence, the agents reach p
∗ = v.
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8Remark 1: We show in this remark that in the absence of a social effect (q = 0), the number of
agents that go towards a destination point pj decreases as Mij increases. To simplify things, we
consider the binary choice case l = 2. In the absence of a social effect, each agent i minimizes
its individual cost (5). In the following, we write Jpji
(
ui, x
(N)
)
as Jpji (ui,M) to emphasize that
the coefficient Mij in J
pj
i
(
ui, x
(N)
)
is equal to M , and that the cost does not depend on x(N)
(q = 0). Following Theorem 1 and the absence of a social effect, for Mi1 = M1 > 0 and Mi2 =
M2 > 0, an agent i goes towards p1 if and only if min J
p1
i (ui,M1) < min J
p2
i (ui,M2). For an
M ′2 > M2, min J
p1
i (ui,M1) < min J
p2
i (ui,M2) ≤ min Jp2i (ui,M ′2). Therefore, by increasing
M2, the number of agents that go towards p2 decreases.
A naive approach to find an exact social optimum would be to solve the lN LQR problems
corresponding to the different combinations of destinations. This is obviously computationally
expensive, and moreover, with this approach each player needs to observe the states and param-
eters of all the other players. Instead, we develop in the following sections a set of decentralized
strategies that are asymptotically optimal. These strategies are decentralized in the sense that an
agent i’s strategy depends only on its state xi and on the distributions P0 and Pθ of the initial
conditions and parameters respectively.
IV. DECENTRALIZED SOCIAL OPTIMUM
A weaker solution concept than the social optimum is the person-by-person optimal solution
[16], [17].
Definition 1: A strategy profile (u∗i , u
∗
−i) is said to be person-by-person optimal with respect to
the social cost Jsoc(ui, u−i) if for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, for all ui ∈ U , Jsoc(ui, u∗−i) ≥ Jsoc(u∗i , u∗−i).
A social optimum is necessarily a person-by-person optimal solution. Following the methodology
proposed in [15], we compute in the following section a set of decentralized approximate person-
by-person solutions. Moreover, we show under some technical assumptions that these solutions
become socially optimal as N →∞.
A. Person-by-Person Optimality
Assuming that the other players fixed their person-by-person optimal strategies u∗−i, an agent
i computes its person-by-person optimal strategy u∗i by minimizing the cost Jsoc(ui, u
∗
−i) over
October 8, 2018 DRAFT
9the strategies ui ∈ U . Similarly to [15], one can show that the social cost can be written
Jsoc(ui, u
∗
−i) = J1,i
(
ui, x
∗(N)
−i
)
+ J2,i(u
∗
−i),
where x∗(N)−i = 1/N
∑N
j=1,j 6=i x
∗
j ,
J1,i
(
ui, x
∗(N)
−i
)
=
∫ T
0
{
xTi Qˆxi +
(
x
∗(N)
−i
)T
Lˆxi +
ri
2
‖ui‖2
}
dt + min
j=1,...,l
Mij
2
‖xi(T )− pj‖2
Qˆ =
q
2
(
In − Z
N
)T (
In − Z
N
)
+
q(N − 1)
2N2
ZTZ
Lˆ = −qZT
(
In − Z
N
)
− qZ + q(N − 1)
N
ZTZ.
The term J2,i(u∗−i) does not depend on the strategy ui of player i. Therefore, minimizing
Jsoc(ui, u
∗
−i) reduces to minimizing J1,i
(
ui, x
∗(N)
−i
)
.
The person-by-person optimal solutions (u∗i , u
∗
−i) are fixed points of the following system of
equations:
u∗i = argmin
ui∈U
J1,i
(
ui, x
∗
−i
(N)
)
i = 1, . . . , N.
Equivalently, these solutions are the Nash equilibria of a noncooperative game involving the N
players defined in (1) but associated with the individual costs
J1,i
(
ui, x−i(N)
)
i = 1, . . . , N. (12)
The players are cost coupled through the average of the population. In the following we develop
via the MFG approach a decentralized approximate Nash strategy profile with respect to (12),
or equivalently a set of decentralized approximately person-by-person optimal strategies with
respect to (2).
B. Mean Field Equation System
According to the MFG approach, each agent assumes a continuum of agents and computes
its best response to an assumed given continuous path x¯. This path represents the mean path
of the infinite size population under a Nash strategy profile. Since the players must collectively
reproduce this assumed mean path when applying their best responses to it, this path can be
computed by a fixed point argument. Under the infinite size population assumption, the costs
(12) reduce to the cost of a generic agent with state x, control input u and parameters θ:
J(u, x¯, x0, θ) =
∫ T
0
{
q
2
‖x‖2 + qx¯TLx+ rθ
2
‖u‖2
}
dt + min
j=1,...,l
{
Mθj
2
‖x(T )− pj‖2
}
, (13)
October 8, 2018 DRAFT
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where x¯ = Ex is the mean trajectory of the infinite size population. The generic agent’s state x
satisfies (1) where (Ai, Bi, ui) is replaced by (Aθ, Bθ, u), with an initial state x0(ω) drawn from
P0 and parameters θ(ω) = (Aθ, Bθ, rθ,Mθ1, . . . ,Mθl)(ω) drawn from Pθ. In the following, we
omit ω from the notation.
1) The Generic Agent’s Best Response to x¯: We define Γθk ∈ C([0, T ],Rn×n), βθk ∈ C([0, T ],Rn)
and δθk ∈ C([0, T ],R) to be the unique solutions of the following backward propagating differ-
ential equations:
Γ˙θk −
1
rθ
ΓθkBθB
T
θ Γ
θ
k + Γ
θ
kAθ + A
T
θ Γ
θ
k + qIn = 0 (14a)
β˙θk =
(
1
rθ
ΓθkBθB
T
θ − ATθ
)
βθk − qLx¯ (14b)
δ˙θk =
1
2rθ
(βθk)
TBθB
T
θ β
θ
k, (14c)
with the final conditions
Γθk(T ) = MθkIn, β
θ
k(T ) = −Mθkpk, δθk(T ) =
1
2
Mθkp
T
k pk.
Lemma 3: Given the initial condition and the parameters, an agent’s best response to x¯ and
the corresponding optimal cost are
uˆ
(
t, x0, θ
)
=
l∑
j=1
− 1
rθ
BTθ
(
Γθj(t)xˆ
(
t, x0, θ
)
+ βθj (t)
)
1Dθj (x¯)
(x0) (15)
J∗
(
x¯, x0, θ
)
=
l∑
j=1
(
1
2
(x0)TΓθj(0)x
0 + (βθj )(0)
Tx0 + δθj (0)
)
1Dθj (x¯)
(x0), (16)
where xˆ (t, x0, θ) is the generic agent’s state under the feedback law (15), Γθk, β
θ
k , δ
θ
k are the
unique solutions of (14a)-(14c), and
Dθj (x¯) =
{
x ∈ Rn
∣∣∣∣∀k = 1, . . . , l, 12xT(Γθj(0)− Γθk(0))x+(
βθj (0)− βθk(0)
)T
x+ δθj (0)− δθk(0) ≤ 0
}
. (17)
Proof: See [18, Lemma 1].
The cost function (13) can be written as the minimum of l LQR cost functions each corresponding
to a distinct possible destination point. When minimizing one of these LQR costs, an agent
October 8, 2018 DRAFT
11
goes towards the corresponding destination point. The region Dθj (x¯) defined in (17) includes
the initial conditions for which the LQR problem corresponding to pj is the less costly LQR
problem. Therefore, there exist l basins of attraction Dθj (x¯), j = 1, . . . , l, where the players
initially present in Dθj (x¯) go towards pj .
We define Ψθj(η1, η2, η3, η4) = Φ
θ
j(η1, η2)
TBθB
T
θ Φ
θ
j(η3, η4), where Π
θ
j(t) =
1
rθ
Γθj(t)BθB
T
θ −ATθ
and Φθj is the unique solution of
dΦθj(t, η)
dt
= Πθj(t)Φ
θ
j(t, η), Φ
θ
j(η, η) = In. (18)
The state trajectory of the generic agent is then [18]
xˆ
(
t, x0, θ
)
=
l∑
j=1
1Dθj (x¯)
(x0)
{
Φθj(0, t)
Tx0 +
Mθj
rθ
∫ t
0
Ψθj(σ, t, σ, T )pj dσ
+
q
rθ
∫ t
0
∫ σ
T
Ψθj(σ, t, σ, τ)Lx¯(τ) dτdσ
}
. (19)
2) Existence of a Solution for the Mean Field Fixed Point Equation System: The mean field
equation system is determined by (14a)-(14c) plus the infinite size population mean equation
x¯(t) =
∫
xˆ
(
t, x0, θ
)
dP0 × Pθ. (20)
This equation system defines an operator G(.) from the Banach space (C([0, T ],Rn), ‖‖∞) into
itself. In fact, given a continuous path x¯, one can solve (14a)-(14c) and compute by (20) the
mean trajectory G(x¯) of the generic agent when it optimally tracks x¯. We define
k1 = E‖x0‖ ×
(
l∑
j=1
max
(θ,t)∈Θ×[0,T ]
‖Φθj(0, t)‖
)
k2 =
l∑
j=1
max
(θ,t)∈Θ×[0,T ]
∥∥∥∥Mθjrθ
∫ t
0
Ψθj(σ, t, σ, T )pj dσ
∥∥∥∥
k3 =
l∑
j=1
max
(θ,t,σ,τ)∈Θ×[0,T ]3
q
rθ
‖Ψθj(σ, t, σ, τ)L‖.
(21)
Since Θ and [0, T ] are compact and Φθj is continuous with respect to time and parameter θ, then
k1, k2 and k3 are well defined.
Assumption 1: We assume that
√
max(k1 + k2, k3)T < pi/2.
Noting that the left hand side of the inequality tends to zero as T goes to zero, Assumption 1
can be satisfied for short time horizon T for example.
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Assumption 2: We assume that L  0, where L is defined in (7).
Assumption 2 is satisfied, for example, when Z = −αIn, α > 0. In this case, the social effect
pushes the agents away from the mean of the population.
Assumption 3: We assume that P0 is such that the P0−measure of quadric surfaces is zero.
Assumption 4: We assume that E‖x0‖2 <∞.
Theorem 4: Under Assumptions 1, 3 and 4, G has a fixed point. If (Aθ, Bθ,Mθj, rθ) =
(A,B,Mj, r), i.e., the parameters are the same for all the agents, the result holds with Assumption
1 replaced by Assumption 2.
Proof: See [18, Theorems 6 and 8].
Theorem 4 provides conditions under which a solution of the mean field equations (14a)-(14c)
and (20) exists. In case of nonuniform parameters, i.e. (Aθ, Bθ,Mθj, rθ) are not the same for
all the agents, the existence of a fixed point is proved by Schauder’s fixed point theorem [18,
Theorem 8] , where Assumption 1 is used to construct a bounded set that is mapped by G into
itself. When the parameters are the same for all the agents, by similar techniques than those
used in [18, Theorem 6], one can show that a fixed point of G is the optimal state of an LQR
problem of running cost q
2
xT (L + In)x +
r
2
‖u‖2. The existence and uniqueness of an optimal
solution of this LQR problem is a consequence of Assumption 2. In the following, (15) and (19)
are considered for a fixed point path x¯. We define
xˆ(N)(t) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
xˆi(t) =
∫
xˆ
(
t, x0i , θi
)
dPN0 (x0i )dPNθ (θi), (22)
and uˆ(N) = (uˆi, uˆ−i), where uˆi(t) = uˆ(t, x0i , θi) and xˆi(t) = xˆ(t, x
0
i , θi).
C. Asymptotic Social Optimum
In this section, we show that when the agents apply the strategy profile uˆ defined below
Theorem 4 and in (15), the corresponding per agent social cost (2) converges to the optimal per
agent social cost as the size of the population increases to infinity. At the end of this section,
we also give an explicit form of the asymptotic per agent optimal social cost.
Assumption 5: We assume that 1
N
∑N
i=1 ‖x0i ‖2 < C for all N > 0.
Remark 2: Assumption 5 implies Assumption 4. In fact, PN0 converges in distribution to P0.
Therefore, there exists on some probability space (Ω,F ,P) a sequence of random variables X0N
of distribution PN0 and a random variable X0 of distribution P0 such that X0N converges with
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probability one to X0. We may consider, without loss of generality, that (Ω,F ,P) is the same
as the one defined in Section II. By Fatou’s Lemma [22],
C ≥ lim inf
N
1
N
N∑
i=1
∥∥x0i∥∥2 = lim inf
N
∫ ∥∥X0N∥∥2 dP
≥
∫
lim inf
N
∥∥X0N∥∥2 dP = ∫ ∥∥X0∥∥2 dP = E∥∥x0∥∥2 .
The functions defined by (14a), (14b) and (14c) are continuous with respect to θ, which belongs
to a compact set Θ. The random variables θ and x0 are assumed to be independent. Therefore,
under Assumption 4 and by Fubini-Tonelli’s theorem [22], the operator G defined in paragraph
IV-B2 by (14a)-(14c) and (20) has the following form:
Exˆ
(
t, x0, θ
)
= G(x¯)(t) =
∫
Θ
∫
Rn
xˆ
(
t, x0, θ
)
dP0(x0)dPθ(θ). (23)
In the following lemma, we show that when applying the decentralized person-by-person
control laws, the finite population average path converges to the fixed point path x¯ that the
agents are optimally tracking. In the standard LQG MFG literature, the proof of this result
relies on the uniform boundedness and equicontinuity of the generic agent’s state trajectory with
respect to the initial conditions and parameters. In our case, this trajectory (19), considered as
a function of the time t, the initial condition x0 and the parameter θ, is discontinuous. In fact,
it has on each basin of attraction Dθj a different structure that depends on the corresponding pj .
Hence, the proof requires some additional constructions to deal with the discontinuity.
Lemma 5: Under Assumptions 3 and 5,
lim
N→∞
∫ T
0
∥∥xˆ(N) − x¯∥∥2 dt = 0. (24)
Proof: In view of (22) and (23), we have
xˆ(N)(t)− x¯(t) =
∫
xˆ
(
t, x0i , θi
)
dPN0 (x0i )dPNθ (θi)−
∫
xˆ
(
t, x0, θ
)
dP0(x0)dPθ(θ).
If xˆ(t, x0i , θi) and xˆ(t, x
0, θ) were uniformly bounded and equicontinuous with respect to the
initial conditions and parameters, then one can show the convergence by [23, Corollary 1.1.5]. But
xˆ(t, x0i , θi) and xˆ(t, x
0, θ) are discontinuous. Alternatively, we show that the set of discontinuity
points has a measure zero under Assumption 3. We then we show that xˆ(N) converges pointwise
to x¯. Finally, We prove the uniform convergence, from which the result follows.
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Pointwise convergence. PN0 and PNθ converge respectively in distribution to P0 and Pθ. There-
fore, there exist on some probability space (Ω,F ,P) a sequence of random variables X0N of
distribution PN0 (resp. a sequence of random variables ξθN of distribution PNθ ), and a random
variable X0 of distribution P0 (resp. a random variable ξθ of distribution Pθ) such that X0N
(resp. ξθN ) converges with probability one to X
0 (resp. ξθ). Thus,
xˆ(N)(t)− x¯(t) =
∫ (
xˆ
(
t,X0N , ξ
θ
N
)− xˆ (t,X0, ξθ)) dP.
For a fixed t, the discontinuity points of xˆ (t, x0, θ) (considered now as a function of x0 and θ)
are included in the set D = {(x0, θ) ∈ Rn × Θ |x0 ∈ ∂Dθj (x¯)}. Under Assumption 3 and the
independence of x0 and θ, one can prove that P0 × Pθ(D) = 0. Hence, xˆ
(
t,X0N , ξ
θ
N
)
converges
with probability one to xˆ
(
t,X0, ξθ
)
. The compactness of [0, T ] and Θ, and the continuity of Πθj
imply ∥∥xˆ (t,X0N , ξθN)− xˆ (t,X0, ξθ)∥∥ ≤ K1‖X0N‖+K2‖X0‖+K3,
for some finite K1, K2, K3 > 0. xˆ(N)(t) converges pointwise to x¯(t) for all t ∈ [0, T ] as a
consequence of Assumption 5, Remark 2 and Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem.
Uniform convergence. As in the proof of Theorem 4, see [18, Theorem 8], one can show that
for all t1, t2,
∥∥xˆ(N)(t1)− xˆ(N)(t2)∥∥ ≤ K|t1− t2| and ‖x¯(t1)− x¯(t2)‖ ≤ K|t1− t2|, where K > 0
is independent of N . We fix an  > 0 and consider a partition 0 = t0 < t1 < · · · < tj = T of [0, T ]
such that for all t, t′ ∈ [tk, tk+1], for N ≥ 1, ‖xˆ(N)(t) − xˆ(N)(t′)‖ <  and ‖x¯(t) − x¯(t′)‖ < 
By the pointwise convergence, there exists N0 such that for all N > N0, for k = 1, . . . , j,
‖xˆ(N)(tk) − x¯(tk)‖ < . We fix N > N0. For an arbitrary t ∈ [0, T ], there exists k such that
t ∈ [tk, tk+1]. We have
‖xˆ(N)(t)− x¯(t)‖ ≤ ‖xˆ(N)(t)− xˆ(N)(tk)‖+ ‖xˆ(N)(tk)− x¯(tk)‖+ ‖x¯(tk)− x¯(t)‖ ≤ 3.
This inequality holds for an arbitrary t ∈ [0, T ], therefore, lim
N→∞
sup
t∈[0,T ]
‖xˆ(N)(t) − x¯(t)‖2 = 0.
This implies (24).
We now state the main result of this paper, which asserts that under appropriate conditions,
when the agents apply the mean field person to person optimization based decentralized strategies
(15), the per agent social cost converges to the per agent optimal social cost as the size of the
population increases to infinity. To compute its control strategy (15), each agent only needs to
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know its initial condition, current state, the distributions P0 and Pθ and a fixed point path x¯ of
the operator G defined in (23).
Theorem 6: Under Assumptions 2, 3, and 5,
lim
N→∞
∣∣∣∣ inf
u∈UN
1
N
Jsoc
(
u, x(N)
)− 1
N
Jsoc
(
uˆ(N), xˆ(N)
)∣∣∣∣ = 0. (25)
Proof: Let u ∈ UN such that Jsoc
(
u, x(N)
) ≤ Jsoc (uˆ(N), xˆ(N)). Noting (19), the compact-
ness of Θ, the continuity of Πθj(t) with respect to t and θ and Assumption 5, one can prove that
(1/N)Jsoc
(
uˆ(N), xˆ(N)
)
< c0, where c0 is independent of N . Therefore, (1/N)Jsoc
(
u, x(N)
)
< c0
and
1
N
N∑
i=1
∫ T
0
{
‖ui‖2 + ‖uˆi‖2 + ‖xi‖2 + ‖xˆi‖2
}
dt < c1,
where c1 > 0 is independent of N . Let x˜i = xi − xˆi and u˜i = ui − uˆi. We have (26) below
1
N
Jsoc
(
u, x(N)
)
=
1
N
Jsoc
(
uˆ(N), xˆ(N)
)
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
∫ T
0
riu˜
T
i uˆidt
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
∫ T
0
{q
2
∥∥x˜i − Zx˜(N)∥∥2 + ri
2
‖u˜i‖2 + q
(
x˜i − Zx˜(N)
)T (
xˆi − Zxˆ(N)
)}
dt (26)
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
min
j=1,...,l
Mij
2
‖xi(T )− pj‖2 − 1
N
N∑
i=1
min
j=1,...,l
Mij
2
‖xˆi(T )− pj‖2.
For a fixed point x¯ of G, and recalling (13) we have
J(ui, x¯, x
0
i , θi) = J(uˆi, x¯, x
0
i , θi) +
∫ T
0
{
q
2
‖x˜i‖2 + ri
2
‖u˜i‖2 + qx¯TLx˜i + qx˜Ti xˆi + riu˜Ti uˆi
}
dt
+ min
j=1,...,l
Mij
2
‖xi(T )− pj‖2 − min
j=1,...,l
Mij
2
‖xˆi(T )− pj‖2, (27)
Now (26) and (27) yield
1
N
Jsoc
(
u, x(N)
)
=
1
N
Jsoc
(
uˆ(N), xˆ(N)
)
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
J(ui, x¯, x
0
i , θi)− J(uˆi, x¯, x0i , θi)
)
(28)
+ q
∫ T
0
(
x˜(N)
)T
Lx˜(N)dt + q
∫ T
0
(
xˆ(N) − x¯)T Lx˜(N)dt.
By the bounds c0 and c1, the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and Lemma 5, we deduce that N =
q
∫ T
0
(xˆ(N)−x¯)TLx˜(N)dt converges to 0 as N goes to infinity. The optimization of uˆi with respect
to J and Assumption 2 imply 1
N
Jsoc(u, x
(N)) ≥ 1
N
Jsoc(uˆ
(N), xˆ(N)) + N .
Remark 3 (Need for Assumption 2): In static games, a sufficient condition of the person-by-
person solution to be a social optimum is the convexity and smoothness of the costs [17,
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Lemma 2.6.1]. Although not explicitly mentioned by the authors [15], this condition (which
is automatically satisfied in the LQG setting) guarantees also the convergence of the person-by-
person solution to the social optimum in case of dynamic LQG MFG problems [15, Theorem
4.2]. In fact, if we follow the techniques used in [15, Theorem 4.2], then by the convexity of
the running cost, (26) implies
1
N
Jsoc
(
u, x(N)
) ≥ 1
N
Jsoc
(
uˆ(N), xˆ(N)
)
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
∫ T
0
{
riu˜
T
i uˆi + q (x˜i)
T (xˆi + Lx¯)
}
dt + N
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
min
j=1,...,l
Mij
2
‖xi(T )− pj‖2 − 1
N
N∑
i=1
min
j=1,...,l
Mij
2
‖xˆi(T )− pj‖2. (29)
We have
d
dt
x˜Ti (Γ
θi
k xˆi + β
θi
k ) = −riu˜Ti uˆi − q (x˜i)T (xˆi + Lx¯) .
Hence,
1
N
Jsoc
(
u, x(N)
) ≥ 1
N
Jsoc
(
uˆ(N), xˆ(N)
)
(30)
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
φi (xi(T ))− φi (xˆi(T ))− x˜Ti (T )
d
dx
φi (xˆi(T ))
)
+ N ,
where φi is the final cost of agent i. If the final costs are convex (which is not the case), then
(30) implies (25). To deal with the non-convexity of the final costs, steps (29) and (30) are
replaced by (27), (28) and Assumption 2.
D. Asymptotic Optimal Social Cost
In this section, we give an explicit form of the asymptotic per agent optimal social cost
lim
N→∞
inf
u∈UN
1
N
Jsoc(u, x
(N)). In the following lemmas, we start by approximating this asymptotic
per agent social cost.
Lemma 7: Under Assumptions 2, 3 and 5,
lim
N→∞
∣∣∣∣ inf
u∈UN
1
N
Jsoc
(
u, x(N)
)− 1
N
Jsoc
(
uˆ(N), x¯
)∣∣∣∣ = 0
Proof: We have
1
N
Jsoc
(
uˆ(N), xˆ(N)
)− 1
N
Jsoc
(
uˆ(N), x¯
)
=
∫ T
0
q
2N
N∑
i=1
(∥∥xˆi − Zxˆ(N)∥∥2 − ‖xˆi − Zx¯‖2) dt
=
q
2
∫ T
0
∥∥Z (xˆ(N) − x¯)∥∥2 dt + q ∫ T
0
(
xˆ(N) − Zx¯)T Z (x¯− xˆ(N)) dt.
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The Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and Lemma 5 imply
lim
N→∞
∣∣∣∣ 1N Jsoc (uˆ(N), xˆ(N))− 1N Jsoc (uˆ(N), x¯)
∣∣∣∣ = 0.
Therefore, we deduce by Theorem 6 the result.
Lemma 8: Under Assumptions 2, 3 and 5,
lim
N→∞
∣∣∣∣ inf
u∈UN
1
N
Jsoc
(
u, x(N)
)− J∞soc(x¯)∣∣∣∣ = 0,
where
J∞soc(x¯) =
∫ [∫ T
0
{
q
2
∥∥xˆ(t, x0, θ)− Zx¯∥∥2 +
rθ
2
‖uˆ(t, x0, θ)‖2
}
dt + min
j=1,...,l
Mθj
2
‖xˆ(T, x0, θ)− pj‖2
]
dP0dPθ.
Proof: By Lemma 7, it suffices to prove that
lim
N→∞
∣∣∣∣J∞soc(x¯)− 1N Jsoc (uˆ(N), x¯)
∣∣∣∣ = 0.
We use the same notation as in the proof of Lemma 5. We have
J∞soc(x¯)−
1
N
Jsoc
(
uˆ(N), x¯
)
= ψ1 + ψ2 + ψ3
where
ψ1 =
q
2
∫ T
0
∫ {∥∥xˆ (t,X0, ξθ)− Zx¯∥∥2 − ∥∥xˆ (t,X0N , ξθN)− Zx¯∥∥2}dPdt
ψ2 =
∫ T
0
∫ {
rξθ
2
∥∥uˆ (t,X0, ξθ)∥∥2 − rξθN
2
∥∥uˆ (t,X0N , ξθN)∥∥2}dPdt
ψ3 =
∫
min
j=1,...,l
Mξθj
2
∥∥xˆ (T,X0, ξθ)− pj∥∥2 dP− ∫ min
j=1,...,l
MξθN j
2
∥∥xˆ (T,X0N , ξθN)− pj∥∥2 dP.
Noting that aTa − bT b = (a + b)T (a − b) and that the minimum of l continuous functions is
continuous, one can prove by the same techniques used in the proof of Lemma 5 that ψ1, ψ2
and ψ3 converge to zero as N goes to infinity.
In the following theorem, we give an explicit form of the asymptotic social cost. This expression
depends only on the distributions P0, Pθ and a fixed point path x¯.
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Theorem 9: Under Assumptions 2, 3 and 5,
lim
N→∞
inf
u∈UN
1
N
Jsoc
(
u, x(N)
)
= −1
2
∫ T
0
qx¯TLx¯dt+
l∑
j=1
∫
1Dθj (x¯)
(x0)
{1
2
(x0)TΓθj(0)x
0 + (βθj (0))
Tx0 + δθj (0)
}
dP0dPθ.
Proof: Following Lemma 8, the per agent asymptotic optimal social cost is equal to J∞soc(x¯).
Noting (20), one can write J∞soc(x¯) = ψ4 − 12
∫ T
0
qx¯TLx¯dt, where
ψ4 =
∫ [∫ T
0
{
q
2
∥∥xˆ (t, x0, θ)∥∥2 + qx¯TLxˆ (t, x0, θ)+ rθ
2
∥∥xˆ (t, x0, θ)∥∥2}dt
+ min
j=1,...,l
Mθj
2
∥∥xˆ (T, x0, θ)− pj∥∥2 ]dP0dPθ =
l∑
j=1
∫
1Dθj (x¯)
(x0)
{
(x0)TΓθj(0)x
0 + βθj (0)
Tx0 + δθj (0)
}
dP0dPθ.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we compare numerically the cooperative and the non-cooperative behaviors of a
group of agents choosing between two alternatives under the social effect. We consider a uniform
group of 400 players initially drawn from the Gaussian distribution N
( [
−5 10
]T
, 15I2
)
and
moving in R2 according to the dynamics
Ai =
 0 1
0.02 −0.3
 Bi =
 0
0.3

towards the potential destination points p1 = (−10, 0) or p2 = (10, 0). Hence we have a binary
choice problem, and in this case one can characterize the way the population splits between
the alternatives, in both the cooperative and non-cooperative cases, by a number λ, which is
the fraction of players that go towards p1. This number λ is a fixed point of a well defined
function F and can be computed by dichotomy. Moreover, one can compute the fixed point path
x¯ that corresponds to λ. For more details one can refer to [18, Theorem 6] and [18, Section
5.A]. We set ri = 10, Mij = 1200, T = 2, Z = 3.5I2, and we vary the social effect coefficient
q. L = ZTZ − Z − ZT = 5.25I2 satisfies Assumption 2. For q = 0 (no social effect), Fig. 1
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and 2 show that the 82% of the players (green squares in Fig. 2) go towards p2 in both the
cooperative and non-cooperative cases. As the social effect increases (q increases from 0 to 45),
in the non-cooperative case, the majority influences the minority whose size reduces from 18%
to zero (Fig. 1 and 4). In the cooperative case however, the size of the majority decreases and
the population splits more evenly between the two choices (Fig. 1 and 3). Fig. 1 also illustrates
that the per agent social cost in the cooperative case is smaller than in the non-cooperative case.
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Fig. 1. Cooperative vs. non-cooperative behavior
VI. CONCLUSION
We consider in this paper a dynamic cooperative game model where a large number of players
are making a socially influenced choice between multiple alternatives. Finding an exact social
optimum can be done by solving a number of LQR problems that grows exponentially with the
number of players. Alternatively, we develop via the MFG methodology a set of decentralized
strategies that are asymptotically socially optimal. The computation of the decentralized strategies
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Fig. 2. Absence of social effect (q = 0). The majority goes towards p2.
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Fig. 3. Cooperative case with high social effect (q = 40). The population splits more evenly.
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Fig. 4. Non-cooperative case with high social effect (q = 40). The population reaches consensus on p2.
assumes that each agent knows the statistical distributions of the initial states and parameters.
For future work, it is of interest to consider situations where the cooperative players learn these
statistical distributions while moving towards the destination points, e.g., by sharing and updating
their current states and parameters through a random communication graph.
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